Without artillery and with loss

Tactical method of “creeping” attack “quietly” small steps in a trench warfare in some respects very good. However, it should be borne in mind that if you for one reason or another are not ready or willing at any moment to move from “quiet” advance to “loud”, losses can not be avoided.

1. Those who have decided that the Ukrainian troops conducted a “reconnaissance in force” — wrong. There was no “Ukrainian commanders with stopwatches, to measure the speed of the reaction of the command of the separatists,” and was a real attempt at the level of company and battalion to improve their position tactically.

The motivation for choosing this particular site and that these items I fully understand and, in my opinion, completely justified. I this spring, being in those parts, he watched as the separatists poured from the woods on our positions South of Svetlodarsk and used advanced their position for a permanent “cashmeriana” our positions: arrive sometimes even at the junction South of Luhansk (turn on Svetlodarsk). Yes, we are talking about the Hobgoblin and the area just East Krasevskio rate.

2. Active steps “to remedy the situation” is clearly organized and made not just with the knowledge of the brigade command, and with his active participation. It is also obvious.

3. In my deeply unprofessional opinion, the method chosen was, to put it mildly, not the best. However, in this case, apparently, this choice was influenced by a “political factor” and, apparently corresponding to the chain of command was simply bound in the choice of methods to accomplish this, as well as to attract necessary forces and means.

I mean the fact that MASH the 54 th ombr could act more quickly and effectively in the interests of the forces and means of performing the task. However, even attracting artillery senior officer, apparently in the area of these actions was associated with a significant Convention, koi in a combat situation is simply unacceptable. Most likely, conceived “improvement” to the relevant commanders were ordered to carry out “quietly”, without attracting additional forces and means (especially heavy weapons).

From 19th to 21st, the separatists are clearly in the firing attitude (I mean, first of all, artillery), had the superiority. Though not always explicit, but the infantry in our front had in this respect was not an easy task (opponents are clearly trying to put our upcoming group fatal fire damage to force her to move to the original). Moreover, they even tried to beat in our tactical rear, trying to prevent a hypothetical capacity-building efforts of our troops and trying to thwart the persistent command and control (was used as the known PU, communications and positions in the second tier).

4. The fact that in the end the Ukrainian army managed to advance and hold partially captured, and quite a significant price (the death of 9 soldiers and floating rates of injuries in the area of more than 2 dozen) does not change the fact that this improvement passed through the stump-deck. For if we intend to pay the promotion for every 1 km (even at 3 km) at this price, this is clearly “not our method”. Moreover, at least half of our losses — the result of a near fire fight resulting from the use by the enemy automatic small arms, something made possible because of the apparent failure of the Ukrainian command to suppress these shooters “something heavy” in advance.

5. The ultimate success was made possible largely thanks to the resilience of ordinary soldiers of the 54th, ombr (which reflect the spontaneous and sporadic counterattacks and endured a massive artillery and mortar fire). And the fact that the enemy also were not Clausewitz separatists decided that the loss of their leading positions in this place, no dramatic changes in the overall tactical situation in this area, when convinced that to enter into battle a large force with the goal of deep penetration of the Ukrainian command is not going to. On and calmed down. The arrival and deployment in the area between Uglegorsk and Bulavino additional tactical reserves the separatists was pure reassurance.

6. Further, the so-called “capture boy” Novoluganskogo in this case is interesting from the point of view of compliance with customs regulations for import and export of goods with controlled and uncontrolled areas (this village until recently was the largest “black hole” for smuggling, probably in the whole area of the ATO, the account sometimes went to ten trucks per week), as well as the scope of activities of the SBU, the rest is pure information and military action, designed once again to crack on with a cotton brain in the occupied territories.


Tactical method of “creeping” attack “quietly” small steps in a trench warfare in some respects very good. Since it allows you to keep a certain way initiative to improve their position and to gradually drive the enemy into unfavorable conditions.

However, it should be borne in mind that if you for one reason or another are not ready or willing at any moment to move from “quiet” advance to “loud” (that is, if necessary, to use and maintain their crawling forward units with something heavier and weightier than a couple of battalion mortars), they will have a very tough and bloody. Because it is one thing to fall asleep bothersome grove ground 122-mm and 152-mm shells, and quite another — to send smoke from the bunkers and trenches of a few separatists “frozen” platoons.