Today in Washington, the new administration of President trump tries to formulate what will be the policy of the USA concerning the Russian-Ukrainian war. This soon will be the meeting trump and Poroshenko.
Trump is trying a more pragmatic rethink the U.S. role in world politics, examine opportunities and risks. The situation in Ukraine is one of the important nodes. The need for military assistance is, in principle, Washington is not disputed, and this is an undoubted merit of the friends of Ukraine in the United States, including in the Republican party.
However, experts in Washington know the answers to three questions:
1. Is critical for the containment of the Russian army supply Ukraine with lethal weapons?
2. It does not cause expansion of the program of American military assistance to the escalation of hostilities and counter-offensive actions of the Russian Federation?
3. What should be the strategy and structure of military assistance to Ukraine?
To answer these three questions, it is necessary to have an objective view of what is really happening in the war.
So, on the Russian-Ukrainian front in the Donbass with a length of 426 kilometers from the local fighting for control of fine chain strong points and dominating heights. A solid line of defense the two sides are not lined up, the defense is a focal character, the intervals between the positions are provided with fire control, mine fields. Given the large gaps between the positions, the extremely small force on the front line, other means to ensure the safety of their troops, in addition to regular attacks, does not exist. Civilian patrols of the OSCE are valid only in the daytime, in the area of intense fighting they don’t stop — it is unsafe.
The war is forces of infantry, with the regular use of heavy artillery, tanks, modern means of reconnaissance and targeting, the most advanced electronic warfare systems. Heavy weapons restrictions apply, the ammunition consumption is low, however, the accuracy of the use of weapons is constantly growing. The basic combat load for infantry weapons. Both sides do not conduct deep offensive operations, the war is limited by forces of office-platoon, full inclusion in the structure of companies and battalions doesn’t happen often. However, the war in this local limited format does not stop.
Russia continues to wage war in the Donbass turned into a training ground for combat training the Russian regular army. Here on a rotational basis being transferred to her unit. The whole system of control, intelligence, artillery, electronic warfare, logistics — all of these are Russian military.
However, there are no prerequisites for the cessation of hostilities. Russia continues to wage war in the Donbass turned into a training ground for combat training the Russian regular army. Here on a rotational basis being transferred to her unit. The whole system of control, intelligence, artillery, electronic warfare, logistics — all of these are Russian military. 1st and 2nd army corps of the occupation forces at the battalion headquarters to command a corps staffed with Russian officers in the status of “advisers”, which in reality is the powers of real commanders. Also in the Donbass regularly sent mechanized infantry and armored units to carry out combat training tasks, including direct participation in hostilities. Nominally assigned to the command posts of local separable perform, in the best case, the functions of the students “advisors” or are just “talking heads” for propaganda. In all combat units core battle groups are the Russian mercenaries. The total number of Russian troops in the Donbass constantly is about 5-6 thousand people.
1st and 2nd army corps Russian mercenaries organizationally included in the structure re-created in 2016-th year 8-th combined arms army of the southern military district of the armed forces deployed on the border with Ukraine and in the Donbass. The closest operational reserves of the Russian occupation corps is re-established in 2017, the 150th motor rifle division deployed in-hour drive from the border with Donbas. Thanks to the permanent presence of Russian armored units occupying the body is not afraid of the Ukrainian offensive operations and can focus all their strength in the first line, not thinking about the reserves.
Due to the large-scale use of new types of weapons in the Donbass Russia has provided a definite advantage in certain types of combat use of heavy artillery, reconnaissance and targeting, the use of unmanned aircraft for strikes on military objects of Ukraine away from the front line. This allows Russian commanders to hold parity in the fighting, despite the great problems of the Russian occupation forces.
The main problem of Putin in a war is lack of human resources and tangible numerical shortage that cannot be corrected, despite considerable financial means allocated by Moscow for the maintenance of the occupying army. Ukrainian troops at the moment, have a certain numerical advantage on the front, and a significant advantage in the motivation and quality of fighters.
The main problem of Putin in a war is lack of human resources and tangible numerical shortage that cannot be corrected, despite considerable financial means allocated by Moscow for the maintenance of the occupying army. Ukrainian troops at the moment, have a certain numerical advantage on the front, and a significant advantage in the motivation and quality of fighters. It should be noted the unpopularity of the war in Russia, a sharp decline in the number of mercenaries from Russia that form the basis of military units of the enemy. However, the Russian army has more sophisticated technical means. Important factor is the lack of motivation of the personnel because the war aims are unclear, the idea of accession of Donbass to the Russian Federation publicly rejected the Russian leadership, and many of the popular commanders of the Russian mercenaries eliminated in the course of internecine conflicts over spheres of influence with the participation of the Russian special services. All this finds confirmation in the fact that in 2015-2017 the years of the Ukrainian army firmly retains the initiative and managed to take control of dozens of square kilometers of the “gray zone” — the uncontrolled territory between the reference points of the opponents left in the Wake of the Russian offensive 2014-2015 and assigned to Ukraine Minsk agreements. The Russian command, despite a series of attacks and assaults on Ukrainian positions, failed in attempts to stop the occupation of “grey areas” Ukrainians. Activity of the Ukrainian troops to tactically advantageous positions significantly increased the stability of defense and confidence. But this is done in terms of the technical superiority of the Russian army, first of all thanks to the motivation and the courage of the Marines.
However, the strengthening of the Ukrainian defense cannot completely eliminate attacks of small groups of Russian infantry and fire raids, heavy artillery and tanks. Losses of the parties in 2017 stabilized. Combat losses of Ukraine — from 15 to 25 soldiers each month. Non-combat losses — 10-15 people a month. This is a very heavy and visible to the country’s damage. However, these losses do not reduce the morale of the army.
Thus, we see that Russia is ready to limit the scope of the war, minimize casualties, but the war Putin isn’t going to stop. Power lever, Russia uses as a permanent the opportunity to blow up the situation and put pressure on the situation in Ukraine through military invasion or limited combat operations.
Russia is investing large resources, with the help of thousands of Russian “volunteers” and “vacationers” from the regular army to enhance the combat capability of occupying buildings. This is done to reduce involvement in direct military action by regular troops and for immediate preparedness to repel possible attacks of the Ukrainian troops on their own.
All this shows the ineffectiveness of a purely diplomatic tools to end the war. Russia is not going to stop the war solely under the influence of sanctions and negotiations.
A purely military solution to the problem, similar to operation Storm in Croatia in 1995, would be the only quick solution to this problem. However, organizational Ukraine to a rapid and decisive operations to minimize the number of victims is not yet ready.
However, it is obvious that if the pressure on the diplomatic front is not associated with the increased pressure on the front of the war, Moscow will be able to continue the local fight for a long time, for many years.
There’s one obvious problem of Putin — an acute shortage of personnel for the occupation forces due to a sharp decline in the popularity of the war against Ukraine in the Russian society.
In connection with the foregoing delivered by American experts questions can be answered this way:
1. The supply of any weapons should be part of the strategy of US involvement in the security of Ukraine and aimed at addressing the imbalance in the weapons systems used by the Russian army in the Donbass. It is necessary to understand the purpose. Lethal weapon Ukraine should be first and foremost not as a political signal. It is necessary to deprive Russia of the technical superiority, through which Putin is now dealing damage to Ukrainian troops, settlements and infrastructure. The Obama administration had set certain crucial types of weapons, which reduced the critical lag in technology of the Ukrainian army, however, still does not provide parity with Russian occupation forces. It is not possible to balance the forces of the parties, shows the weakness of military aid from the West Ukraine and allows the Russian army to cause significant losses of the Ukrainian forces.
Ukraine needs lethal weapons, which could quickly hit the mobile Russian heavy artillery, placed at a distance of 10-20 kilometers from the front edge and are often leading the unpunished attacks of the Ukrainian positions, as well as high-precision weapons system stations of electronic reconnaissance and target designation. In the terms of the Minsk restrictions and the great superiority of the Russian army in munitions accuracy becomes more critical. The backlog of the Ukrainian army in other types of heavy weapons is not as critical as in this area. For lack of missiles or aircraft or land-based, or long-range artillery systems with guided or guided munitions in combination with the detection systems, communication and fire control. Such assistance would help in the short term to change the nature of warfare, and the danger of a quick retaliatory strike will significantly reduce the effectiveness of Russian heavy artillery to bombard Ukrainian positions and settlements.
2. Direct participation of the Russian army in massive battles to break through the defense of Ukrainian troops is currently unlikely. The Russian command realizes that a head-on collision and maneuver the fighting will inflict great losses, and it is dangerous for Putin, because it will lead to the fear of Russian society and to the repetition of the “Afghan” and “Chechen” syndromes, when the unpopular war led to the discrediting of the ruling regimes. In the summer of 2014 in the Russian army were mass refusals to participate in the war against Ukraine. In addition, the decline of the Russian economy as a result of Western sanctions could be extended in case of invasion. Sanctions damage Russia and the threat to their gain also makes the scenario of a large-scale invasion is unlikely.
The response of Russia in the framework of the Minsk agreements can only be called on the script of the war in Georgia in 2008. That is, if the Ukrainian army will take a deep offensive operation, which will take place at a slow pace, which will give the Russian commanders time to analyze the situation and prepare for the invasion and information campaigns in support of the war. Under other circumstances, Putin will not risk his army. Can this lead to arms race in the Donbass? No, because Russia is involved in this race from the start, and already has used on the front of all modern types of conventional weapons. By the way, it became clear that the capabilities of the Russian army is rather limited, and modern military equipment supplied to the troops in limited scale. Technical superiority in certain types of arms of the Russian army is only in some parts of the front.
3. Strategy military assistance to Ukraine in the conditions of the Minsk agreements and limitations to the use of weapons with a caliber higher than 100 mm should not be based on the supply of certain types of weapons, and the comprehensive improvement of combat capability of the APU and NSU that Ukraine could solve the security problem at the front in Donbass. Ukraine has qualitative and quantitative superiority in infantry, and the imposition of the modern enemy infantry war would be the key to increasing the combat capability of Ukraine. This requires the integrated delivery of primarily non-lethal weapons of the infantry. The priorities are: 1) tactical and operational-tactical communication equipment for entire connections and associations; 2) control system forces and means of destruction; 3) reconnaissance and target designation, artillery reconnaissance means, tools, passive electronic intelligence, electronic warfare equipment; 4) a mass supply means for providing a night of action units and infantry, night vision systems and thermal imaging sights, laser rangefinders and optical means of observation. Even the regular Russian army is not able to equip and prepare the infantry for night operations consisting of entire battalions. Such supplies would allow Ukraine to concentrate funds on the purchase of weapons to equip the army anti-tank missile systems and precision weapons of domestic production. At the front of 426 kilometres is the most vulnerable and weak spot of the enemy — the quality and quantity of infantry.
Victory in the war for Ukraine may not be in deep offensive operations, and a radical weakening of the fighting efficiency and the reduction of combat strength of the occupation forces. The occupying army will not sustain losses at the level of 200-300 mercenaries in a month.
Victory in the war for Ukraine may not be in deep offensive operations, and a radical weakening of the fighting efficiency and the reduction of combat strength of the occupation forces. The occupying army will not sustain losses at the level of 200-300 mercenaries in a month. Lost the desire to earn easy money will prevent recruitment of new entrants. As soon as the Kremlin realizes that his military instruments in the current environment do not work, Russia will be forced to become more compliant in the negotiations. If the United States will help Ukraine to prove to the Russians that military superiority in this conflict, they do not have and create problems and losses more than political opportunities, Russia will again make an attempt to return to the political format of negotiations, and the war will be able to guide in the direction of a peaceful settlement. The situation in Syria for a long time was at a standstill until very recently, according to the decision of trump, the American army began to strike blows to positions of the Russian ally Assad, and has not yet been declared a security zone, closed to the actions of Assad’s army and Russian troops, where violators will immediately get a bomb strikes NATO. Russia understands only the language of force. Only effective and systematic military help from the West will create the conditions for a real peace settlement and the withdrawal of occupation troops. According to our information, and in the U.S. Congress, and in the security Council, the Ministry of defence and many people understand that. The draft decisions prepared. But the final decision is made by the President, for whom Russia vnutripsihicheskoy toxic, but for the soul — close. Word by Donald trump.