Information about Russia supplying some of new weapons to Azerbaijan in recent days, forces us to rethink not only continuing on the Karabakh-Azerbaijan line of contact of the confrontation, but the issue of establishing military-political balance in the region.
Naturally, all this should not cause panic, the more reason for hasty action, because the Armenian side also has enough weapons to confront the attacks of the enemy. The issue here is the correct calculation of the changes in the nature of a future war in consequence of the arms race and the training of the army and society to a new military-political situation.
Recently Azerbaijan Baku experienced “Spikes” hitting Armenian rocket station, when it became known that Azerbaijan had bought Russian “Chrysanthemum” that performs the same function. This created the conditions for the destruction of the Armenian military equipment over long distances.
It is clear that having the ability to capture the movement of military equipment of the enemy observation devices and strike with the same or even greater range in the future, the Armenian side will also increase the choice of weapons. In consequence of all this will be created (if not already created) a situation where none of the parties will not dare to resort to the use of armored vehicles in the first place, to the mass use of tank columns.
The question arises — who will it be advantageous in the case of resumption of war? It is clear that the party that intends in a future war more likely to break through the enemy’s defenses and enter the operating space. This means that the displacement of the arms race on the plane of containment of weapons intended for strategic breakthroughs, objectively reduce the threat of their use. That is, future war promises to be more tactical, less maneuverable, which is objectively advantageous for the defending side.
Moreover, in this scenario will be emphasized the superiority of hand, having long-range missiles to destroy targets behind enemy lines. This means that the Armenian side has much more reason for concern in connection with possibility of proliferation in the former Soviet Union in such weapons, referring to the desire of the leadership of Belarus to purchase the system “Iskander”.
In previous years, the official Minsk has repeatedly sold their weapons to Baku, so now the desire to have such a system gives a more serious basis for concern than the fact that Azerbaijan is Israel’s “Spikes” or Russian “Chrysanthemum.”
Consequently, existing Armenian side in the framework of the CSTO should be used primarily to limit the spread of “Iskander” in the post-Soviet space.
Moreover, in terms of increasing opportunities for tactical warfare, also increases the mutual vulnerability of the territories, therefore, it becomes senseless even to think of giving up part of these territories. Thus, Azerbaijan with its new mania for the acquisition of new weapons just makes the Armenian side to think about more robust protection that is now at hand.
Increase opportunities for tactical war will force the Armenian side to think about strengthening the engineering structures and the transition to more scattered scheme of redistribution of forces. The main thing is that the increase the firepower of the parties in the near make meaningless, the use of large concentrations of armored vehicles and aircraft to break through the front line. This can lead to a marked limitation of military mania Azerbaijan because striking long shots and hitting one tank or taking one life, it is impossible to think about the transition to a large-scale action.
In parallel with this, the enemy will undoubtedly be to think about balancing the destructive power of the Armenian “Iskander” and sooner or later will become a new batch of rockets of distant lesions.
On this plane the arms race, the enemy gives a certain privilege to the presence in Nakhichevan private army, not hiding the threat of destruction of the Armenian nuclear power plant with the help of this army, which already leave an impression of nonsense.
We believe that the new stage of the arms race when it becomes apparent deepening of the trend of depreciation of the traditional ways of war, for the Armenian side it is important to have several options of applying disproportionate blows to the enemy, simultaneously a few scenarios, fully and thoroughly excluding the possibility of Azerbaijan nuclear blackmail, or rather the threat of destruction of a nuclear power plant.
